

DDCI

Return to  
Douglas

FILE

@ - 134

1983

SECRET - SEC STATE CABLES

SECRET

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/21 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001400007-6

NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS



CONFIDENTIAL

# Department of State

S/S-0  
INCOMING

PAGE 03 OF 09 SECTO 01031 00 OF 04 090659Z C19/21 004129 NOD681

US TO SHIFT THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP TO A MORE  
STABLE AND SOUND BASIS.

4. Q: WHAT DO YOU MEAN WHEN YOU SAY YOU HAVE AGREED  
TO NEGOTIATE ON SPACE ARMS?

- A: THE UNITED STATES HAS VIEWED DEFENSES AS  
INCLUDING GROUND-BASED WEAPONS WHICH CAN TARGET  
SYSTEMS IN SPACE AS WELL AS SPACE-BASED DEFENSIVE  
SYSTEMS. THE SOVIETS VIEW SUCH SYSTEMS AS SPACE  
ARMS, AND IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE TERM "SPACE  
ARMS" IS USED. THE SYSTEMS TO BE ADDRESSED INCLUDE  
EXISTING SOVIET DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

5. Q: THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF DISAGREEMENTS WITH  
THE US DELEGATION ON THE APPROACH TO THE GENEVA  
MEETING. HOW IS THIS OUTCOME VIEWED BY THE MEMBERS  
OF THE DELEGATION?

- A: THOSE REPORTS ARE PURE BALONEY. I HAVE  
REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THIS WAS AN EFFECTIVE,  
WELL-WORKING DELEGATION. ALL MEMBERS CONTRIBUTED TO  
THE FINAL PRODUCT. WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT ON THE  
OUTCOME.

6. Q: DOES THIS AGREEMENT MEAN THAT THE US HAS NOW  
AGREED TO PUT THE SDI ON THE BARGAINING TABLE?

- A: OUR POSITION HAS LONG BEEN THAT WE ARE  
PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTION OF  
DEFENSIVE AND SPACE ARMS AND WAYS TO ESTABLISH A MORE  
STABLE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP. THE THREAT TO  
STRATEGIC STABILITY IS POSED NOT BY OUR RESEARCH  
PROGRAM, BUT BY AN EXISTING SOVIET NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE

PROGRAM. I MADE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT IS  
COMMITTED TO DETERMINING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT

N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S



CONFIDENTIAL

# Department of State

S/S-0  
INCOMING

PAGE 04 OF 09    SECTO 01031    00 OF 04    090659Z    C19/21 004129    NOD681  
MAY BE POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE TO ENHANCE STABILITY  
THROUGH INCREASED RELIANCE ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. WE  
BELIEVE BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE ANSWER  
TO THIS QUESTION.

7.    Q:    DOES THIS MEAN THE SOVIETS HAVE "CAVED" ON  
THEIR DEMANDS THAT SDI BE ABANDONED?

-    A:    WE TAKE TODAY'S OUTCOME AS SIGNIFYING  
AGREEMENT THAT IT IS VITALLY URGENT THAT OUR  
COUNTRIES GET ON WITH THE TASKS OF NEGOTIATING  
REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS AND ENHANCING STRATEGIC  
STABILITY, AND THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD SEEK TO  
IMPOSE PRECONDITIONS.

-    AS FOR THE SDI, MR. GROMYKO MADE CLEAR THAT THE  
SOVIET POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED, AND THAT THEIR  
PRIORITY OBJECTIVE IN NEGOTIATIONS IS THE  
NON-MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE. SO, AS I SAID, WE  
HAVE LONG AND COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD OF US.

8.    Q:    IF YOUR POSITIONS ARE SO FAR APART ON SDI,  
AREN'T THE NEGOTIATIONS DOOMED TO AN EARLY STALEMATE?

-    A:    I'D RATHER NOT MAKE ANY PREDICTIONS. WE HAVE  
NOW AGREED TO A FORUM IN WHICH TO TACKLE THESE  
COMPLEX ISSUES HEAD-ON; FOR OUR PART, WE WILL  
APPROACH THESE TALKS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT.

9.    Q:    WHAT WAS THE MOOD IN THE MEETINGS?

-    A:    I WOULD CALL IT BUSINESSLIKE AND FRANK.  
BOTH SIDES AVOIDED POLEMICS AND SPOKE DIRECTLY TO THE  
ISSUES.

10.   Q:    HOW WILL THE OUTCOME OF THESE MEETINGS  
AFFECT US-SOVIET RELATIONS?

NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS



CONFIDENTIAL

# Department of State

S/S-0  
INCOMING

PAGE 05 OF 09 SECTO 01031 00 OF 04 090659Z C19/21 004129 NOD681

- A: I WOULD NOT WANT TO SUGGEST THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED A "BREAKTHROUGH" ON ARMS CONTROL OR IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS MORE GENERALLY. THESE MEETINGS REPRESENT THE BEGINNING OF A LONG PROCESS, AND MUCH HARD BARGAINING LIES AHEAD.

- BUT THE POSITIVE OUTCOME AND, JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, THE BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH OUR EXCHANGES TOOK PLACE, IS A GOOD SIGN.

- WE HOPE THE SOVIETS WILL BE PREPARED TO MATCH THE PERSISTENCE AND FLEXIBILITY WITH WHICH WE WILL APPROACH THESE NEW NEGOTIATIONS. IF THEY DO, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENTS THAT SHOULD HELP CREATE A MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

11. Q: BY A COMPLEX OF NEGOTIATIONS. DO YOU MEAN THAT ALL OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN MERGED INTO A SINGLE NEGOTIATION?

- A: NO, WE ARE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE ISSUES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS, INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS, AND DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS ARE INTERRELATED. THAT BEING SAID, WE THINK OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY BE CHanneled BY DIVIDING UP THE SUBJECT MATTER INTO THESE THREE AREAS.

12. Q: BUT HAVEN'T THE SOVIETS LINKED ALL THREE, FORA. MAKING NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS HOSTAGE TO US

CONCESSIONS ON SPACE?

- A: OUR POSITION IS THAT, IF AN UNDERSTANDING IS REACHED IN ONE OR TWO AREAS THAT IS IN BOTH SIDES' INTEREST, IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. WE HOPE THAT, WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE, THE SOVIETS WILL TAKE A

CONFIDENTIAL

N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S



CONFIDENTIAL

# Department of State

S/S-0  
INCOMING

PAGE 06 OF 09 SECTO 01031 00 OF 04 090659Z C19/21 004129 NOD681

SIMILARLY PRACTICAL APPROACH.

13. Q: DID THE SOVIETS PROPOSE AN ASAT MORATORIUM AS A CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEN BACK DOWN? IS THE US WILLING TO AGREE TO LIMITS ON ASAT TESTING IN NEGOTIATIONS?

- A: OUR AGREEMENT TODAY WAS WITHOUT ANY PRECONDITIONS. THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION WAS SET FORTH IN HIS UNGA SPEECH, AND HAS NOT CHANGED.

14. Q: DO YOU REALLY BELIEVE THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS? OR IS THEIR OBJECTIVE TO CREATE THE APPEARANCE OF NEGOTIATING, WHILE SEEKING TO WHIP UP OPPOSITION TO US DEFENSE PROGRAMS ON THE PART OF US AND EUROPEAN PUBLICS?

- A: PROPAGANDA IS, UNFORTUNATELY, AN EVER-PRESENT ELEMENT OF THE SOVIETS' APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. WE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR OBJECTIVES GO BEYOND PROPAGANDA, AND THAT THEY ARE TRUE TO THEIR WORD WHEN THEY SAY THEY ARE INTERESTED IN RADICAL SOLUTIONS IN THE UPCOMING TALKS.

15. Q: WHAT FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS DO YOU ENVISAGE?

- A: WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN TOUCH THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

16. Q: WILL THE OUTCOME OF THESE MEETINGS HELP TO EASE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES TO CUT BACK FUNDING FOR KEY PROGRAMS LIKE THE M-X?

- A: WE BELIEVE THE M-X AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM PROVIDE IMPORTANT NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE FOR ATTAINING A GOOD START

AGREEMENT. WITH NEGOTIATIONS AGAIN ON THE HORIZON, WE HOPE THE CONGRESS WILL AVOID STEPS THAT WOULD WEAKEN THIS LEVERAGE.

17. Q: DOES THE FAILURE OF THIS MEETING TO REACH

CONFIDENTIAL

NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS



CONFIDENTIAL

# Department of State

S/S-0  
INCOMING

PAGE 07 OF 09 SECTO 01031 00 OF 04 090659Z C19/21 004129 NOD681  
AGREED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR SPACE ARMS TALKS MEAN  
WE FACE AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE?

- A: WE DO NOT ADVOCATE AN ARMS RACE, EITHER ON EARTH OR IN SPACE. THE SDI IS STRICTLY A RESEARCH PROGRAM. NO DECISIONS TO GO BEYOND RESEARCH HAVE BEEN TAKEN, NOR COULD THEY BE FOR SEVERAL YEARS. IF, IN THE FUTURE, WE DETERMINED THAT DETERRENCE COULD BE IMPROVED THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES, ARMS CONTROL WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN ENSURING STABILITY.

18. Q: WHY HAVE YOU ALLOWED THE SDI -- WHICH IS AN IDEALISTIC THEORY THAT HAS NOT EVEN GOT PAST THE EARLY RESEARCH PHASE -- TO DOOM ALL HOPES OF REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS?

- A: WE ARE COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN ALL CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND WILL SPARE NO EFFORT IN SEEKING AGREEMENTS TO THAT END. WE BELIEVE THAT, SHOULD WE DECIDE TO DEPLOY NEW DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN THE FUTURE, THEY COULD LEAD TO REDUCED RELIANCE ON THE THREAT OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATION, AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO THE FURTHER REDUCTION, AND EVENTUAL ELIMINATION, OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

19. Q: THE SOVIETS PREVIOUSLY SAID THEY WOULD NOT RETURN TO THE START OR INF TALKS UNTIL THE US

REVERSED ITS LRINF DEPLOYMENTS? DOESN'T TODAY'S OUTCOME MEAN THE SOVIETS HAVE "CAVED" ON THAT POSITION?

- A: I WOULD NOT CHARACTERIZE IT THAT WAY. WE AND THE SOVIETS ARE EMBARKING ON A NEW NEGOTIATING EFFORT TO ADDRESS IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS



CONFIDENTIAL

# Department of State

S/S-0  
INCOMING

PAGE 08 OF 09 SECTO 01031 00 OF 04 090659Z C19/21 004129 NOD681

20. Q: YOU TOLD GROMYKO THAT YOU HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NEW IDEAS REGARDING STRATEGIC AND INF SYSTEMS? CAN YOU DESCRIBE THOSE IDEAS AND HIS REACTION?

- A: THE MAJOR FOCUS OF OUR EFFORT IN THE LAST TWO DAYS WAS TO AGREE ON SUBJECTS AND OBJECTIVES FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS. WE DID TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE IDEAS, BUT FELT THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE JUST ANNOUNCED.

21. Q: HAVE THE SOVIETS DROPPED THEIR DEMAND THAT US LRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS BE REMOVED FROM EUROPE?

- A: THE FULL SOVIET POSITION ON INF SYSTEMS REMAINS TO BE SEEN. WE WOULD HOPE THEY WILL HAVE NEW PROPOSALS TO OFFER THAT BEGIN TO MEET US AND ALLIED SECURITY CONCERNS.

22. Q: YOU STATED THAT IN THE NEAR TERM, YOU WOULD SEEK TO REVERSE THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY REGIME THAT HAS OCCURRED OVER THE PAST DECADE. WHAT DO YOU MEAN?

- A: THERE ARE SOME SOVIET ACTIVITIES WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THAT TREATY. I RAISED OUR CONCERNS WITH MR. GROMYKO. JUST AS IMPORTANT, THE ABM TREATY WAS TO HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A

COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT OF INDEFINITE DURATION COVERING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THAT HAS NOT HAPPENED, AND, AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE BUILDUP.

23. Q: THIS ANNOUNCEMENT DOES NOT REALLY AMOUNT TO MUCH. ISN'T IT TRUE THAT ALL YOU HAVE AGREED TO DO IS TALK?



N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S



CONFIDENTIAL

## Department of State

S/S-0  
INCOMING

PAGE 09 OF 09 SECTO 01031 00 OF 04 090659Z C19/21 004129 NOD681

- A: WHEN WE AND THE SOVIETS ANNOUNCED THIS MEETING LAST NOVEMBER, WE STATED THAT THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO AGREE ON THE SUBJECTS AND OBJECTIVES FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS. WE'VE BEEN SUCCESSFUL ON THAT SCORE; ADMITTEDLY, ITS ONLY THE FIRST STEP TOWARD A SUBSTNTIVE ACCORD, BUT IT WAS A CRUCIAL FIRST STEP.

24. Q: ISN'T THERE A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN YOUR. NEAR AND LONG TERM OBJECTIVES? YOU PROPOSE TO REVERSE THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY BUT IN THE LONG TERM ADVOCATE STEPS THAT ARE WHOLLY INCONSISTENT WITH THAT AGREEMENT.

- A: OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN A STABLE DETERRENT BALANCE. IN THE NEAR TERM, THIS CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY ADHERING TO THE ABM TREATY AS IT WAS UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH SIDES IN 1972. BUT, IN THE LONG RUN, NEW TECHNOLOGIES MAY MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION, WHICH IS BASED ALMOST WHOLLY ON THE THREAT OF DEVASTATING NUCLEAR RETALIATION, TO ONE IN WHICH BOTH SIDES PLACE MORE RELIANCE ON DEFENSE IN THEIR DETERRENT POSTURE. SUCH A SITUATION COULD BE MORE STABLE THAN THE CURRENT ONE.

25. Q: GIVEN THE MIXTURE OF SUBJECTS IN THIS COMPLEX OF NEGOTIATIONS, COULDN'T INF. WHICH HAS BEEN

AN INTRACTABLE ISSUE, GET LOST IN THE SHUFFLE?

- A: WE WILL PRESS FOR RADICAL REDUCTIONS OF AND EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS ON BOTH STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS. WHEN NEGOTIATIONS GET ON, WE'LL HAVE CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR THE SOVIETS IN BOTH AREAS.

SHULTZ

SECRET

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077116  
SIT955 AN011176 TOR: 008/0145Z

DISTRIBUTION:

WHSR COMMENT:

8 Jan 85:

One cy to: ES

25X1

One cy to: EA/DCI

One cy to: CYACIS

OP IMMED

DE RUFHGYA #0171 0080112

O 080032Z JAN 85 ZFF4

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9795  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08SECTO 1017

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: US, UR, PREL, PARM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY THE SECRETARY AT  
FIRST MEETING WITH GROMYKO, MONDAY MORNING,  
JANUARY 7, 1985

REF: SECTO 1015

1. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS ON WHICH THE SECRETARY  
DREW IN HIS FIRST MEETING WITH GROMYKO, MONDAY MORNING,  
JANUARY 7, 1985.

**SECRET****WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077116

3 INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS  
-----

-- PRESIDENT VIEWS THIS MEETING AS MAJOR OPPORTUNITY TO LAUNCH NEW EFFORT AIMED AT REACHING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE SECURITY OF BOTH OUR NATIONS.

-- MUCH TIME HAS BEEN LOST SINCE USSR SUSPENDED NEGOTIATIONS AT THE END OF 1983. NEW WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS CONTINUING ON BOTH SIDES. INCREASING CONCERNS ABOUT CONSISTENCY OF SOVIET ACTIONS WITH CONCEPTS UNDERLYING EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

-- OUR PRINCIPAL TASK TODAY, HOWEVER, IS TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE, TO ESTABLISH A MORE EFFICIENT PROCESS AND MORE EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATING APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING CRITICAL ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS. HOPE OUR MEETINGS TODAY AND TOMORROW CAN LAY THE BASIS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD THAT END.

-- AGREED PURPOSE OF OUR MEETINGS IS TO REACH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS. I INTEND TO PRESENT SOME IDEAS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS ON PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS; EXPECT YOU WILL DO THE SAME.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIVE GIVE-AND-TAKE THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT OTHER SIDE'S CONCERNS. AS PRESIDENT HAS STRESSED, WE ARE READY.

-- OUR MEETINGS IN SEPTEMBER AND THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN OUR TWO LEADERS GIVE ME REASON TO HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE HEADWAY IN THESE NEXT TWO

**SECRET**

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077116

DAYS TOWARD IDENTIFYING AREAS OF COMMON GROUND.

-- WE BOTH AGREE THAT THE "QUESTION OF QUESTIONS" IS TO ENSURE THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP EVOLVES TOWARD PEACE RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT WE GET CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- WE AGREE THAT THE PREEMINENT TASK TOWARD THIS END IS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS, AND IN THE LONGER TERM TO ELIMINATE THEM.

-- WE ALSO SEEM TO AGREE THAT NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS SHOULD ESTABLISH A MORE RELIABLE AND STABLE DETERRENT BALANCE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES.

-- I AM ESPECIALLY ENCOURAGED BY CHAIRMAN CHERNENKO'S EXPRESSION OF READINESS FOR "RADICAL SOLUTIONS" IN THE NEW ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WE ARE HERE TO ESTABLISH. PRESIDENT REAGAN AGREES FULLY ON THE NEED TO BRING ABOUT A RADICAL REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS, AND IN THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

-- INDEED, WE AGREE ON THE MOST RADICAL SOLUTION OF ALL: THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH.

-- WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD OF  
BT

**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01 OF 03      USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171      DTG: 080032Z JAN 85      PSN: 077127  
SIT956      AN011177      TOR: 008/0130Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGVA \*0171 0080106  
O 080032Z JAN 85 ZFF4  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9796  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 08 SECTO 1017

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US, UR, PREL, PARM  
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY THE SECRETARY AT

US TO TRANSLATE AREAS OF COMMON GROUND INTO CONCRETE  
AGREEMENTS WHICH BOTH OUR COUNTRIES CAN ACCEPT. WITH  
HARD AND CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES, HOWEVER,  
I BELIEVE WE CAN SUCCEED.

4. EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT  
-----

-- I WOULD LIKE TO SET FORTH OUR VIEWS ON THE FUTURE  
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES.

**SECRET****WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077127

-- THE US HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE US WOULD INITIATE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE USSR OR THE WARSAW PACT UNLESS WE OR OUR ALLIES WERE ATTACKED. WE HOPE THE USSR COMPARABLY HAS NO INTENTION OF INITIATING AN ATTACK ON THE US OR ITS ALLIES.

-- THE US IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT FORCES TO DETER ATTACK AGAINST OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES. THIS MEANS FORCES OF SUCH SIZE, EFFECTIVENESS AND SURVIVABILITY AS TO DENY AN OPPONENT ANY POSSIBILITY OF GAIN FROM AN ATTACK. WE EXPECT THAT YOU WISH TO MAINTAIN SIMILAR CAPABILITIES.

-- WE WILL MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT DETERRENT WITH OR WITHOUT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP CAN BE MADE MORE STABLE AND SECURE, AND THAT STABILITY AND SECURITY CAN BE MAINTAINED AT SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS, IF THIS RELATIONSHIP IS REGULATED THROUGH EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL. WE PREFER THAT PATH.

-- BUT IT IS DISTURBING THAT THE USSR HAS PLACED SO MUCH EMPHASIS UPON MASSIVE EXPANSION AND MODERNIZATION OF ITS NUCLEAR FORCES, BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE. WE ARE OBLIGED TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN OUR OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES.

-- UNDER TODAY'S CONDITIONS AND THOSE OF THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, IF A CRISIS SITUATION SHOULD ARISE, BOTH SIDES HAVE CERTAIN INCENTIVES TO ACT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY WITH THEIR MILITARY POWER, BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL. THIS CREATES AN UNSTABLE SITUATION WHICH COULD MAKE CRISES MORE

**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077127

DIFFICULT TO MANAGE AND, IF CONFLICT BREAKS OUT, MAKES RAPID ESCALATION TO HIGH LEVELS OF DESTRUCTION MORE LIKELY.

-- THIS IS A DANGEROUS SITUATION. IT IS ONE WE MUST ADDRESS. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES NECESSARY TO DO SO WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR BOTH SIDES. BUT WE MUST TACKLE THIS PROBLEM; THE DANGER MUST BE DEFUSED.

-- IN PREPARING FOR THIS MEETING AND FOR RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS, THE US HAS CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF OUR PAST ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. WHILE SOME WORTHWHILE AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED, OUR EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS HAVE NOT FULFILLED THEIR ORIGINAL PROMISE IN TERMS OF CONSTRAINING THE ARMS COMPETITION AND ENHANCING STABILITY.

-- IN THE LATE 1960S AND EARLY 1970S, WE NEGOTIATED MEASURES THAT WE HOPED WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE SECURITY OF EACH OF US. THOSE CONSTRAINTS WERE BASED ON THREE ASSUMPTIONS:

(1) WITH DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS SEVERELY LIMITED, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PLACE COMPARABLE LIMITS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES, AND TO

ESTABLISH A RELIABLE DETERRENT BALANCE AT REDUCED LEVELS;

(2) THE CONSTRAINTS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES WOULD PREVENT BREAK-OUT OR CIRCUMVENTION; AND

BT

**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01 OF 03    USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171    DTG: 080032Z JAN 85    PSN: 077090  
SIT957    AN011178    TOR: 008/0132Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001  
-----

OP IMMED

DE RUFHGVA \*0171 0080107

O 080032Z JAN 85 ZFF4

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9797  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 08 SECTO 1017

NODIS

SECTO

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: US, UR, PREL, PARM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY THE SECRETARY AT

(3) BOTH SIDES WOULD ADHERE TO THE LETTER  
AND SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENTS.

-- THESE PREMISES, HOWEVER, HAVE COME INCREASINGLY  
INTO QUESTION OVER THE PAST DECADE.

-- BOTH SIDES TODAY HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER  
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES THAN IN 1972. NOT ONLY HAVE  
THE NUMBERS OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS REACHED EXCEEDINGLY



**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077090

HIGH LEVELS, OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN, SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED ON THE SOVIET SIDE, IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS, WHICH HAVE THE CAPABILITY FOR A DEVASTATING ATTACK ON MISSILE SILOS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES.

-- ON THE DEFENSIVE SIDE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE ABM TREATY, HAS EXPLOITED TECHNICAL AMBIGUITIES, AND HAS ALSO TAKEN STEPS WE BELIEVE ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT CONSISTENT WITH IT.

-- THE VIABILITY OF THE ABM TREATY WAS BASED ON SEVERAL KEY ASSUMPTIONS:

- THAT LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADARS WOULD BE CONSTRAINED SO AS TO LIMIT POTENTIAL BREAKOUT OR CIRCUMVENTION TO PROVIDE THE BASE FOR A TERRITORIAL ABM DEFENSE. ALLOWANCE WAS MADE FOR EARLY WARNING RADARS, BUT THEY WERE TO BE ON THE PERIPHERY AND OUTWARD FACING.
- THAT ABM INTERCEPTORS, LAUNCHERS AND RADARS WOULD BE NEITHER MOBILE NOR TRANSPORTABLE.
- THAT THE LINE BETWEEN ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES WOULD BE UNAMBIGUOUS.
- THAT THE ABM TREATY WOULD SOON BE ACCOMPANIED BY A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY, OF INDEFINITE DURATION, ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES.

-- UNFORTUNATELY, TODAY THOSE ASSUMPTIONS NO LONGER APPEAR VALID.

**SECRET****WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077090

-- THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR APPEARS TO BE IDENTICAL TO RADARS FOR DETECTING AND TRACKING BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND COULD SERVE AS PART OF A BASE FOR A NATIONWIDE ABM DEFENSE.

-- THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE LOCATION AND ORIENTATION OF THIS RADAR WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE ABM TREATY IS A SERIOUS CONCERN, AND IT CAUSES US TO QUESTION THE SOVIET UNION'S LONG-TERM INTENTIONS IN THE ABM AREA.

-- WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT OTHER SOVIET ABM ACTIVITIES THAT, TAKEN TOGETHER, GIVE RISE TO LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS ON OUR PART AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO DEPLOY A WIDE-SPREAD ABM SYSTEM. THE SA-X-12 ANTI-AIR MISSILE IS ONE ELEMENT OF OUR CONCERN; IT SEEMS TO HAVE SOME CAPABILITIES AGAINST STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND THEREBY BLURS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SYSTEMS AND ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS.

-- THE SOVIET UNION IS PURSUING ACTIVE RESEARCH PROGRAMS ON MORE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES, WHICH HAVE A DIRECT APPLICATION TO FUTURE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

-- MOST IMPORTANTLY, AS TO OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES, IT HAS NOT PROVEN POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD BRING ABOUT MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS IN SUCH ARMS, PARTICULARLY IN THE MOST DESTABILIZING CATEGORIES OF SUCH FORCES.

BT

**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01 OF 03    USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171    DTG: 080032Z JAN 85    PSN: 077092  
SIT958    AN011179    TOR: 008/0134Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGVA \*0171 0080108  
O 080032Z JAN 85 ZZH ZFF4  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9798  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 08 SECTO 1017

NODIS

SECTO

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US, UR, PREL, PARM  
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY THE SECRETARY AT

5. OUR VIEW OF THE WAY IT SHOULD EVOLVE  
-----

-- IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THE  
CONCEPTUAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH WE  
APPROACH RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS.

-- FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WE WISH TO WORK WITH YOU  
TO RESTORE AND MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE THE REGIME FOR

**SECRET****WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077092

RELIABLE MUTUAL DETERRENCE WHICH, IN 1972, WAS  
THOUGHT BY BOTH SIDES TO BE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE.

- WE MUST NEGOTIATE THE "EFFECTIVE MEASURES  
TOWARD REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS,  
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AND GENERAL AND  
COMPLETE DISARMAMENT" CALLED FOR WHEN WE  
SIGNED THE ABM AGREEMENT IN 1972. WE ARE  
PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARD  
THIS END.
- WE MUST REVERSE THE EROSION WHICH HAS TAKEN  
PLACE OF THE PREMISES ASSUMED WHEN WE  
ENTERED INTO THE ABM TREATY.

-- THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS  
OF BOTH SIDES MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY.

-- NOW I KNOW YOU WILL ARGUE THAT IT IS THE US, AND  
NOT THE SOVIET UNION, THAT HAS DECIDED TO EMBARK ON  
THE CREATION OF A NATIONWIDE ABM SYSTEM, INCLUDING  
THE DEPLOYMENT OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN SPACE. ON  
THIS, LET ME STATE THE FOLLOWING.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS SET AS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE FOR THE  
COMING DECADE THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER NEW  
DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES COULD MAKE IT FEASIBLE FOR OUR  
TWO COUNTRIES TO MOVE AWAY FROM A SITUATION IN WHICH  
THE SECURITY OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES IS BASED ALMOST  
EXCLUSIVELY ON THE THREAT OF DEVASTATING OFFENSIVE  
NUCLEAR RETALIATION.

-- WE BELIEVE BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN  
DETERMINING THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. INDEED,  
YOUR COUNTRY HAS HISTORICALLY SHOWN A GREATER  
INTEREST IN STRATEGIC DEFENSES THAN THE UNITED

**SECRET**

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077092

STATES, AND DEPLOYS THE WORLD'S ONLY OPERATIONAL ABM SYSTEM.

-- A SITUATION IN WHICH BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES COULD SHIFT THEIR DETERRENT POSTURE TOWARD GREATER RELIANCE ON EFFECTIVE DEFENSES COULD BE MORE STABLE THAN THE CURRENT SITUATION.

-- IT COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ACHIEVING THE RADICAL SOLUTION BOTH OUR LEADERS SEEK -- ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTIRELY ON A GLOBAL BASIS.

-- OUR EFFORT TO SEE WHETHER THIS IS POSSIBLE IS EMBODIED IN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. THE SDI IS STRICTLY A RESEARCH EFFORT AND IS BEING CONDUCTED IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE ABM TREATY.

-- NO DECISIONS ON MOVING BEYOND THE STAGE OF RESEARCH HAVE BEEN TAKEN, NOR COULD THEY BE FOR SEVERAL YEARS. SUCH RESEARCH IS NECESSARY TO SEE IF IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE TOWARD A WORLD IN WHICH THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR IS ELIMINATED.

-- WHENEVER RESEARCH VALIDATES THAT A DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGY WOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD EXPECT TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIET UNION THE BASIS ON WHICH IT WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO FORCE STRUCTURES. IF EITHER SIDE EVER WISHES TO AMEND THE ABM TREATY, THEN THERE ARE PROVISIONS FOR DISCUSSING THAT. IN THE US VIEW, SUCH DISCUSSIONS SHOULD PRECEDE ACTION BY SUFFICIENT TIME SO THAT STABILITY IS GUARANTEED.

-- THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED FOR  
BT

**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01 OF 03    USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171    DTG: 080032Z JAN 85    PSN: 077095  
SIT959    AN011180    TOR: 008/0135Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGA \*0171 0080109  
O 080032Z JAN 85 ZFF4  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9799  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 08 SECTO 1017

NODIS

SECTO

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS:    US, UR, PREL, PARM  
SUBJECT:    TALKING POINTS USED BY THE SECRETARY AT

YEARS IN THE SORT OF RESEARCH BEING PURSUED UNDER SDI.

-- I DOUBT THAT EITHER SIDE IS PREPARED TO ABANDON  
ITS RESEARCH EFFORTS NOW, BEFORE WE KNOW WHETHER  
THERE ARE DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT COULD ENHANCE RATHER  
THAN DIMINISH SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES. WE DOUBT AN  
EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE BAN ON RESEARCH, AS SUCH,  
COULD BE DESIGNED IN ANY EVENT.

-- IN THE LONGER RUN, IT APPEARS THAT NEW

**SECRET****WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077095

TECHNOLOGIES MAY OPEN POSSIBILITIES OF ASSURING THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES THROUGH A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RESPECTIVE DEFENSES. TO THE U.S., HIGH-CONFIDENCE DEFENSES WOULD APPEAR TO BE A SOUNDER APPROACH TO PEACE AND SECURITY THAN THE CURRENT SITUATION, AND COULD PRODUCE A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP.

-- THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER FORMS OF COOPERATION WOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCH A LESS THREATENING ENVIRONMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES COULD BE SERVED BY SUCH AN EVOLUTION.

-- BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE A CONTINUING DISCUSSION WITH YOU NOW ON THE WHOLE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE (BOTH EXISTING AND POSSIBLE FUTURE SYSTEMS), REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP THAT WE SHOULD BE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN IN THE FUTURE.

-- IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS, WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO ADDRESS SPACE ARMS ISSUES.

1- TWO DAYS OF TALKS IN GENEVA DO NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH TIME TO FULLY EXPLORE ALL THE ISSUES.

-- WE BELIEVE OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS TODAY AND TOMORROW SHOULD FOCUS ON THE MOST URGENT QUESTION BEFORE US: HOW TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS AND ENHANCE THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.

**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077095

**6. OUR VIEW OF SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES  
OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS**  
-----

-- HAVING DISCUSSED OUR GENERAL VIEWS, I PROPOSE THAT WE NOW CONCENTRATE ON OUR PRINCIPAL TASK, AGREEMENT ON THE FORA FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THEIR SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES, AND THEIR LOCATION AND TIMING.

-- I WOULD HOPE THAT, BY THE CONCLUSION OF OUR PROGRESS TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT TO OPEN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS.

(REGARDING OFFENSIVE FORCES)

-- WITH RESPECT TO OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, I PROPOSE THAT WE BEGIN WHERE WE BROKE OFF IN THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT MUCH GOOD WORK WAS DONE IN BOTH SETS OF TALKS, EVEN THOUGH MANY ISSUES REMAINED UNRESOLVED.

-- MOREOVER, WHILE THE ISSUES INVOLVED ARE CLEARLY RELATED, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST PRACTICAL TO ADDRESS STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN SEPARATE FORA.

-- THUS, WE PROPOSE THAT WE BEGIN NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND A SECOND SET OF NEW  
BT



**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01 OF 03    USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171    DTG: 080032Z JAN 85    PSN: 077098  
SIT960    AN011181    TOR: 008/0137Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGVA \*0171 0080110  
O 080032Z JAN 85 ZZH ZFF4  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9800  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 06 OF 08 SECTO 1017

NODIS

SECTO

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US, UR, PREL, PARM  
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY THE SECRETARY AT

NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE  
NUCLEAR FORCES.

-- THE SUBJECT OF THE FIRST, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS  
-- OR, MORE PRECISELY, INTERCONTINENTAL-RANGE  
OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES -- IS FAIRLY WELL  
ESTABLISHED.

-- WE ARE PREPARED IN STEP-BY-STEP FASHION TO REDUCE  
RADICALLY THE NUMBERS AND DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF

**SECRET**

## **WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077098

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THE IMMEDIATE GOAL OF ENHANCING THE RELIABILITY AND STABILITY OF DETERRENCE, AND WITH THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THEIR EVENTUAL ELIMINATION.

-- THUS, THE SUBJECT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS.

-- I PROPOSE THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF RENEWED TALKS BE AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE AND RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBERS AND DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

-- THE SECOND NEGOTIATION WE ENVISAGE IS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES.

- HERE TOO I THINK THAT OUR PREVIOUS EFFORTS REVEALED A COMMON EMPHASIS ON REDUCING LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, WITH THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THEIR TOTAL ELIMINATION.

- MOREOVER, WE SEEM TO AGREE THAT WHILE SYSTEMS IN OR IN RANGE OF EUROPE SHOULD BE A CENTRAL CONCERN, ANY AGREEMENT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE GLOBAL ASPECTS OF THE INF PROBLEM.

- AND BOTH SIDES HAVE PROPOSED THAT CERTAIN INF AIRCRAFT AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILE SYSTEMS BE DEALT WITH IN SOME FASHION.

-- WE PROPOSE THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE NEW TALKS BE REDUCTIONS IN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE ARMS.

-- THE OBJECTIVE OF SUCH TALKS SHOULD BE AN EQUITABLE

**SECRET**

## **WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 03 OF 03    USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171    DTG: 080032Z JAN 85    PSN: 077098

AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE AND  
RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE OFFENSIVE  
NUCLEAR ARMS.

(REGARDING DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS)

-- LET ME NOW TURN TO OUR IDEAS FOR HOW TO ADDRESS  
THE OTHER ASPECTS OF "NUCLEAR AND SPACE" ARMS ON  
WHICH WE AGREE IN NOVEMBER TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS.

-- IN THE EARLY DAYS OF SALT I BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT  
A TREATY LIMITING DEFENSIVE ARMS SHOULD BE PARALLELED  
BY A TREATY LIMITING OFFENSIVE ARMS AND VICE VERSA.  
FOR REASONS INCLUDING THOSE I ADVANCED THIS MORNING,  
WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THERE IS MERIT IN SUCH AN  
APPROACH.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE USSR BELIEVES THAT  
CONTROLLING WEAPONS IN SPACE SHOULD BE A PRIORITY  
MATTER. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT A FORUM PERMITTING  
NEGOTIATION OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS WOULD BE A MORE  
APPROPRIATE COMPLEMENT TO NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON  
OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

-- IN SUCH A FORUM, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS  
THE QUESTION OF SPACE-BASED DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN A

SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. SPACE-RELATED  
QUESTIONS COULD ALSO BE TAKEN UP IN THE OFFENSIVE  
ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL, AS APPROPRIATE.

-- BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO ADDRESS  
QUESTIONS RELATING TO EXISTING DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS  
BASED ON EARTH, AS WELL AS POTENTIAL FUTURE

BT

**SECRET**

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03    USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171    DTG: 080032Z JAN 85    PSN: 077107  
SIT961    AN011182    TOR: 008/0142Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGVVA \*0171 0080110  
O 080032Z JAN 85 ZZH ZFF4  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9801  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 07 OF 08 SECTO 1017

NODIS

SECTO

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: US, UR, PREL, PARM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY THE SECRETARY AT

SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS, AND TO RESTORE AND REVALIDATE  
THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH THE ABM TREATY WAS BASED.

-- WE THEREFORE PROPOSE THAT WE ESTABLISH A THIRD  
NEGOTIATING FORUM, IN WHICH EACH SIDE COULD ADDRESS  
ASPECTS OF THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP NOT DEALT  
WITH IN THE TWO OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS FORA.

-- IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL, WE HAVE TAKEN CAREFUL  
NOTE OF THE CONCERN YOU EXPRESSED IN OUR SEPTEMBER

**SECRET**

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077107

MEETINGS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN OUTER SPACE.

-- GIVEN OUR SHARED OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESSED, WE BELIEVE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD FOCUS ON DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR SYSTEMS THAT WOULD BE BASED IN SPACE OR DETONATED IN SPACE, AS WELL AS DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BASED ON THE EARTH.

-- THUS WE PROPOSE THAT THE SUBJECT OF THIS THIRD NEGOTIATION BE DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE RELIABILITY AND STABILITY OF DETERRENCE, AND ON STEPS TOWARD THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR-ARMED DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

-- I SUGGEST THAT THE LOCATION OF ALL THREE TALKS BE GENEVA AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS OPEN IN THE FIRST HALF OF MARCH.

(REGARDING CONTINUING FORUM TO ADDRESS STRATEGIC STABILITY)

-- THE MOST PRESSING TASK IS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES.

-- BUT IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO ESTABLISH A SENIOR-LEVEL PROCESS TO COMPLEMENT THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS AND TO PROVIDE A CHANNEL FOR TALKING ABOUT BROADER PROBLEMS.

-- WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS TO HAVE MORE UNSTRUCTURED, CONCEPTUAL EXCHANGES ON THE MAINTENANCE OF STRATEGIC

**SECRET**

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171 DTG: 080032Z JAN 85 PSN: 077107

STABILITY AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES.

-- CONTINUING EXCHANGES ON THESE SUBJECTS AT OUR LEVEL WOULD BE PART OF THIS PROCESS. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS SUGGESTED, IT MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL TO HAVE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES MEET TO ADDRESS BOTH CONCEPTUAL AND CONCRETE IDEAS.

-- SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES COULD ALSO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN CLARIFYING EACH SIDE'S CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS IN EXPLORING THE DETAILS OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

-- MOREOVER, AS FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED IN INDIVIDUAL AREAS, SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES COULD MEET PERIODICALLY TO HELP BREAK LOGJAMS AND COORDINATE OUR JOINT EFFORTS IN THE VARIOUS FORA.

-- I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING YOUR THOUGHTS ON SUCH EXCHANGES, AND ON OUR PROPOSAL FOR PERIODIC MEETINGS BETWEEN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES.

(CONCLUSION).

-- I HOPE YOU WILL GIVE ALL THESE PROPOSALS SERIOUS CONSIDERATION, SO THAT BY THE END OF OUR MEETINGS TOMORROW WE WILL HAVE IDENTIFIED SOME COMMON GROUND ON "SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES" OF NEW NEGOTIATIONS IN THE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE AREAS.

-- OF COURSE, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT A FULLY AGREED APPROACH CAN ONLY EMERGE THROUGH THE NEGOTIATING

BT

**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 01      USDEL SECRETARY IN 0171      DTG: 080032Z JAN 85      PSN: 077099  
SIT962      AN011183      TOR: 008/0137Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGVA \*0171 0080111  
O 080032Z JAN 85 ZFF4  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9802  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 08 OF 08 SECTO 1017

NODIS

SECTO

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US, UR, PREL, PARM  
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY THE SECRETARY AT

PROCESS ITSELF.

-- IN THE REMAINDER OF TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS, WE SHOULD  
BEGIN THE PROCESS OF REACHING A FULLER UNDERSTANDING  
OF ONE ANOTHER'S APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BY  
EXPLORING SOME OF THE CONCRETE ISSUES INVOLVED. SHULTZ  
BT

ITEMPO 6129398 0082214Z FRP]

SECRET

FRP: , , 3, , , , ,

NODIS

STATE

ACTION: NONE

INFO: FILE, RF,

85 6129398

SSO

PAGE 001

NC 6129398

TOR: 082206Z JAN 85

OO RUEAIIA

DE RUEHC #6573 0082205

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 082138Z JAN 85 ZFF5

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO INFC IFUEKJCS/DOD IMMEDIATE

RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC 3517

BT

S E C R E T STATE 006573

NODIS

FOLLOWING SECTO 1025 DTD JAN 8 SENT ACTION SECSTATE BEING  
REPEATED TO YOU

QUOTE: S E C R E T SECTO 1025

PASS TO NICK PLATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: JOINT US-SOVIET STATEMENT

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE AGREED JOINT  
U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT. STATEMENT IS EMBARGOED FOR  
RELEASE AT 6:00PM WASHINGTON TIME, 12:00 MIDNIGHT  
GENEVA TIME:

BEGIN TEXT:

-- AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED, A MEETING WAS HELD ON  
JANUARY 7 AND 8, 1985 IN GENEVA BETWEEN GEORGE P.  
SHULTZ, THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, AND ANDREI A.  
GROMYKO, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE

SECRET

DCI  
DDCI  
DDI  
D/50UA  
ACIS  
D/47AK



SECRET

STATE

85 6129398

SSO

PAGE 002  
TOR: 062206Z JAN 85

NC 6129398

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR AND MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR.

-- DURING THE MEETING THEY DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT  
AND OBJECTIVES OF THE FORTHCOMING US-SOVIET  
NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS.

-- THE SIDES AGREE THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE  
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE A COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS  
CONCERNING SPACE AND NUCLEAR ARMS -- BOTH STRATEGIC  
AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE -- WITH ALL THESE QUESTIONS  
CONSIDERED AND RESOLVED IN THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP.

-- THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TO  
WORK OUT EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS AIMED AT PREVENTING AN  
ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND TERMINATING IT ON EARTH, AT  
LIMITING AND REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS, AND AT  
STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY. THE NEGOTIATIONS  
WILL BE CONDUCTED BY A DELEGATION FROM EACH SIDE  
DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS.

-- THE SIDES BELIEVE THAT ULTIMATELY THE  
FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS, JUST AS EFFORTS IN GENERAL  
TO LIMIT AND REDUCE ARMS, SHOULD LEAD TO THE COMPLETE  
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS EVERYWHERE.

-- THE DATE OF THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
AND THE SITE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE AGREED  
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WITHIN ONE MONTH.

END TEXT. SHULTZ  
UNQUOTE DAM

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

3

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0185 DTG: 081234Z JAN 85 PSN: 000241  
SIT057 AN011271 TOR: 008/1245Z

8 Jan 85:

One Cy to: ES

25X1

One Cy to: EA/DCI

One Cy to: C/ACIS

OP IMMED

DE RUFHGVA \*0185 0081237

O 081234Z JAN 85 ZFF4

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9815  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SECTO 1024

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

EO: DECL: OADR

TAGS: UR, US, PREL, PARM

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON THE SECRETARY'S

-- THIRD MEETING WITH GROMYKO, TUESDAY MORNING,

-- JANUARY 8, 1985

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE SPENT ANOTHER TWO-AND-A-HALF HOURS THIS MORNING  
GOING OVER AND CLARIFYING OUR POSITIONS ON THE STRUCTURE  
AND CONTENT OF POSSIBLE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. NOTHING

JAN 8 11 24 AM '85

**SECRET****WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0185 DTG: 081234Z JAN 85 PSN: 000241

VERY NEW AROSE FROM THIS DISCUSSION BUT IT GAVE ME THE CHANCE TO EXPLAIN CLEARLY OUR VIEW OF WHAT THE THREE GROUPS MIGHT DISCUSS. GROMYKO MADE AN INTERESTING CLARIFICATION THAT IN EFFECT MEANS THAT ANY AGREEMENTS COMING OUT OF THE GROUPS CAN BE CALLED UP AND APPROVED IF BOTH SIDES WANT IT THAT WAY. AT THE END OF OUR SESSION BOTH SIDES TABLED A TEXT OF A DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. (THESE TEXTS ARE CONTAINED IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THIS MESSAGE.

3. BEFORE WE BEGAN THE MORNING SESSION, I TOOK GROMYKO ASIDE AND WENT THROUGH PRIVATELY WITH HIM ALL OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POINTS INCLUDING SPECIFIC NAMES AND CASES, AS WELL AS GENERAL POINTS ON EMIGRATION, HEBREW TEACHERS, DIVIDED FAMILIES AND AMERICAN NATIONALS. HE LISTENED BUT TOOK THE PREDICTABLE POSITION THAT HE WOULD NOT COMMENT.

4. I THEN BEGAN THE MEETING WITH A LENGTHY STATEMENT DESIGNED TO PUT ON THE RECORD OR RESTATE OUR VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT MATTERS FOR THE THREE FORA: STRATEGIC ARMS, INF, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE AND SPACE ARMS. I RESTATED WHAT WE EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE IN EACH AND RECALLED PARTICULARLY MY LIST OF SUBJECTS FOR THE THIRD FORA WHICH I LAID OUT YESTERDAY. I RECOGNIZED THAT WE HAVE A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE THIRD FORA AND WANTED THAT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THEY WOULD COME TO SEE THE ADVANTAGE OF LOOKING AT DEFENSE IN RELATION TO OFFENSE. HIS LONG ANSWER AMOUNTED TO A NEGATIVE ANSWER ON EVER BEING PERSUADED THAT SDI WAS DEFENSIVE. HE INSISTED THAT THEY WOULD ALWAYS ASSUME IT TO BE OFFENSIVE BUT THAT DID NOT SEEM TO DETER HIM FROM WANTING TO GET HIS COMPLEX OF NEGOTIATIONS GOING. HE EVEN MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE COMPLICATED SYSTEM OF JOINT REVIEWS OF THE WORK OF THE THREE GROUPS WAS NOT DESIGNED TO STOP ALL AGREEMENTS FROM EMERGING.

**SECRET****WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 03 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0185 DTG: 081234Z JAN 85 PSN: 000241

5. I MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANY PROPOSITION THAT APPEARED TO RULE OUT OR CONTROL RESEARCH IN THE SPACE AREA. HE DID NOT APPEAR TO FEEL THAT THEY WOULD STOP THEIR RESEARCH, BUT RATHER STATED THAT THEY HOPED NOTHING WOULD BE ALLOWED TO THE DEVELOPMENT STAGE.

6. FINALLY, WE BOTH TABLED TEXTS (WHICH FOLLOW) AND THESE WILL BE DISCUSSED AT OUR MEETING BEGINNING AT 2:30 PM.

-7. BEGIN TEXT OF US STATEMENT:

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN A NEW COMPLEX OF NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS THE INTERRELATED QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS. TO THIS END, THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS WILL BE CONVENED IN GENEVA, BEGINNING ON MARCH 5, 1985, TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS, INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE AND SPACE ARMS. THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, WITH THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-8. BEGIN TEXT OF SOVIET STATEMENT:

AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED, A MEETING BETWEEN ANDREI A. GROMYKO, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, AND GEORGE SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE USA, TOOK PLACE ON JANUARY 7 AND 8, 1985, IN GENEVA.

THE QUESTION REGARDING THE SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES OF THE FORTHCOMING SOVIET-US NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE

**SECRET**

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0185 DTG: 081234Z JAN 85 PSN: 000241

WEAPONS WAS DISCUSSED DURING THE MEETING.

THE SIDES AGREE THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE TALKS WILL BE A  
COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS PERTAINING BOTH TO SPACE WEAPONS AND

BT

**SECRET**

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0185 DTG: 081234Z JAN 85 PSN: 000233  
SIT058 AN011272 TOR: 008/1243Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM SIT /007  
-----

OP IMMED

DE RUFHGA \*0185 0081238

O 081234Z JAN 85 ZFF6

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 SECTO 1024

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

EO: DECL: OADR

TAGS: UR, US, PREL, PARM

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON THE SECRETARY'S

NUCLEAR ARMS -- STRATEGIC AND MEDIUM-RANGE -- WITH ALL  
THESE QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED AND RESOLVED IN THEIR  
INTERRELATIONSHIP.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TO WORK OUT  
EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS AIMED AT PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE  
IN OUTER SPACE, LIMITING AND REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS,  
AND STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY.

EVENTUALLY, THE TWO SIDES BELIEVE, THE FORTHCOMING

**SECRET**

**WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM**

PAGE 02 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0185 DTG: 081234Z JAN 85 PSN: 000233

NEGOTIATIONS AS, GENERALLY, EFFORTS IN THE FIELD OF  
LIMITING AND REDUCING ARMAMENTS SHOULD LEAD TO THE  
COMPLETE ELIMINATION EVERYWHERE OF NUCLEAR WEAONS.

THE DATE OF THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR  
VENUE WILL BE AGREED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WITHIN  
ONE MONTH. SHULTZ  
BT

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

(2)

PAGE 01 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0172 DTG: 080206Z JAN 85 PSN: 077177  
SIT972 AN011193 TOR: 008/0224Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM SIT /007  
WHSR COMMENT: PLS ADVISE FURTHER DISSEM... CLEAN COPY FOR PRES

One cy to: C/ACIS

One cy to: EA/DCI

One cy to: ES

JAN 8 10 05 AM '85

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGVA #0172 0080217  
O 080206Z JAN 85 ZFF6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9803

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 1018

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

EO 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: UR, US, PARM, PREL  
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
SECRETARY'S SECOND MEETING WITH GROMYKO, MONDAY  
AFTERNOON, JANUARY 7, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SUBJECT: MY SECOND MEETING WITH GROMYKO

SECRET



## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0172 DTG: 080206Z JAN 85 PSN: 077177

N  
O  
D  
I  
SN  
O  
D  
I  
SN  
O  
D  
I  
SN  
O  
D  
I  
S

1. SUMMARY: WE HAD ANOTHER THREE HOUR SESSION THIS AFTERNOON WHICH BEGAN WITH MY ANSWERS TO GROMYKO'S QUESTIONS ON HOW WE WOULD HANDLE SPACE ISSUES IN A THIRD FORUM. I WAS ABLE TO GIVE, AND BUD ABLY BUTTRESSED, A COMPLETE STATEMENT OF YOUR RATIONALE FOR PROCEEDING WITH SDI. THIS LED GROMYKO TO A LONG AND TORTURED RESPONSE SAYING THAT THEY COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT SDI WAS A PRELUDE TO A FIRST STRIKE STRATEGY. I REBUTTED THAT POSITION AND ALSO FOUND AN OPENING TO STATE OUR STRONG VIEW ON THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION. BOTH BUD AND I TRIED TO SHOW HOW A DEFENSE INTEGRATION WITH OFFENSE COULD AT SOME POINT LEAD TO GREATER STRATEGIC STABILITY. I WOULD HAVE TO SAY BASED ON GROMYKO'S REACTION THAT WE STRUCK OUT. HE DID. HOWEVER, PUSH ON TO OUTLINE IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HIS PLAN FOR NEGOTIATION ON ALL THESE ISSUES. HE OUTLINED WHAT HE CALLED AN INTERRELATED STRUCTURE FOR DISCUSSING SPACE, STRATEGIC ARMS, AND MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES WHICH HAS A RUBE GOLDBERG CHARACTER ABOUT IT. WE WILL HAVE TO COME UP WITH A TACTIC FOR DEALING WITH THIS LATER THIS EVENING. END SUMMARY.

2. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH MY ANSWERS TO GROMYKO'S TWO QUESTIONS AT THE END OF THE MORNING SESSION DEALING WITH THE TIMING OF ANY DISCUSSION ON SDI. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAVE NOTHING CONCRETE AT THE MOMENT SINCE OUR RESEARCH IS NOT FAR ENOUGH ALONG, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD EXPECT TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHEN AND IF THE RESEARCH EFFORTS OF EITHER SIDE DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE CAN BE SYSTEMS WHICH COULD USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO A TRANSITION AWAY FROM RELIANCE ON THE THREAT OF MASSIVE DESTRUCTION. NONETHELESS, I WENT ON, WE ARE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS EVEN IN ADVANCE OF ANY POSITIVE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS ON HOW SUCH DEFENSE SYSTEMS COULD PLAY A

SECRET

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0172 DTG: 080206Z JAN 85 PSN: 077177

ROLE IN ENHANCED DETERRENCE.

3. IN RESPONSE TO GROMYKO'S REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT SUBJECT MATTER THE THIRD FORUM WE HAD PROPOSED WOULD ADDRESS, I NOTED THAT WE WOULD EXPECT IT TO BE A FORUM IN WHICH BOTH SIDES WOULD BE FREE TO RAISE WHATEVER ISSUES RELATING TO DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IT WISHED TO RAISE, INCLUDING THOSE BASED ON EARTH OR SPACE OR DIRECTED AGAINST WEAPONS EITHER ON THE EARTH OR IN SPACE. I OBSERVED THAT NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN SPACE WERE ALREADY BANNED BY THE OUTER SPACE TREATY. AT THE SAME TIME, I WENT ON, RECENT TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS HAD MADE DISTINCTIONS HARDER TO DRAW BOTH BETWEEN ABM AND CERTAIN ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AND BETWEEN RADARS FOR THE PURPOSES OF EARLY WARNING, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, SPACE TRACK, AND ABM. THERE WAS, I OBSERVED, A GOOD DEAL OF WORK TO BE DONE IN REEXAMINING AND REINFORCING THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS UNDERLYING THE ABM TREATY AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN GENERAL. ADDITIONALLY, SUCH A FORUM WOULD SEEM TO BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SYSTEMS AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY MIGHT BEAR ON OUR EVENTUAL GOAL OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE DID NOT THINK, I CONCLUDED, THAT BANS ON RESEARCH COULD BE VERIFIABLE OR EFFECTIVE; INDEED, IF SUCH RESEARCH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENING THE DANGERS OF WAR, IT SHOULD NOT BE BANNED.

4. I THEN GAVE A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW OF HOW OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS RELATED AND DREW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS MUST AGREE SINCE CHERNENKO SAID THEY WERE ORGANICALLY LINKED. I RELATED THIS TO ASSUMPTIONS OF THE EARLY 1970'S AND THE FACT THAT WE WERE BOTH ENGAGED IN RESEARCH IN THIS AREA. I

SECRET

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0172 DTG: 080206Z JAN 85 PSN: 077177

CONCLUDED BY MAKING THE POINT THAT IF NUCLEAR ARMS ARE  
SERIOUSLY REDUCED THERE IS LESS TO DEFEND AGAINST AND  
BT

NO  
DIS  
S

NO  
DIS  
S

NO  
DIS  
S

NO  
DIS  
S

SECRET

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0172 DTG: 080206Z JAN 85 PSN: 077179  
SIT973 AN011194 TOR: 008/0227Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM SIT /007

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGVA #0172 0080218  
O 080206Z JAN 85 ZFF6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9804

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 SECTO 1018

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

EO 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: UR, US, PARM, PREL  
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE

THEREFORE AN SDI ROLE IS MORE EASILY DEFINED.

5. THIS LED GROMYKO TO A LONG DISQUISITION ON HOW  
THE SOVIETS VIEW SDI AS NOT DEFENSIVE BUT OFFENSIVE  
BECAUSE IT WILL BECOME THE BASIS FOR THE FIRST  
STRIKE. HE CONCLUDED THAT NEITHER SIDE NEEDED SDI.  
WE NEED TO DO AWAY WITH SWORD AND WE DON'T NEED A  
SHIELD, HE SAID. WE WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE  
CREATION OR JUSTIFICATION OF ANY SUCH SYSTEM. HE

SECRET

# NODIS

**NODIS**

# NODIS

7. BUD GAVE AN EXCELLENT PRESENTATION OF YOUR REASONS FOR ATTEMPTING TO SEE THROUGH RESEARCH ON WHETHER THERE IS A ROLE FOR DEFENSE TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE. HE EMPHASIZED THE EFFECT ON DETERRENCE IF THE OFFENSIVE BALANCE SHOULD BECOME UNSTABLE THROUGH THE GROWTH OF

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0172 DTG: 080206Z JAN 85 PSN: 077179

CRUISE AND MOBILE MISSILES. ALSO THAT SOVIET OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE PROGRAMS COULD UNDERMINE OFFENSIVE DETERRENCE. HE ADDED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF RELYING ON MASSIVE OFFENSE VERSUS SYSTEMS THAT THREATEN NO ONE. HE ALSO DESCRIBED WHY SOVIETS SHOULD HAVE NO FEAR OF FIRST STRIKE.

8. I THEN ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS DESIGNED TO GET GROMYKO TO SAY HOW THEY WOULD PROPOSE TO GET RADICAL REDUCTIONS. HE WAS RESOUNDINGLY UNPREPARED OR UNWILLING TO GIVE A CREDIBLE RESPONSE. BUT HE WENT ON TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR A WHOLE SERIES OF INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO MAKE A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD.

9. OUR FINAL AND MOST INTERESTING EXCHANGE WAS ON THE STRUCTURE OF POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS. HE IN EFFECT PROPOSED THREE FORA -- ON SPACE, STRATEGIC FORCES AND INF -- BUT GAVE IT A COMPLEX OVERLAY WHERE A SENIOR NEGOTIATOR ON EACH SIDE WOULD DECIDE WITH HIS OPPOSITE NUMBER TWO QUESTIONS: FIRST, THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF EACH GROUP; AND, SECOND, WHETHER ANYTHING DECIDED OR NEGOTIATED IN A PARTICULAR GROUP OR FORA COULD BE ALLOWED TO SURFACE FOR DECISION BY GOVERNMENTS IF ITS INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH WORK IN THE OTHER GROUPS HAD

NOT BEEN APPROACHED. THIS IS THEIR WAY OF APPLYING THE QUOTE, ORGANIC LINK, UNQUOTE. GROMYKO SAID THAT THEIR SENIOR MAN WOULD ALSO BE THE NEGOTIATOR IN ONE OF THE GROUPS. SOME THINGS WOULD NOT REQUIRE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERRELATIONSHIP, E.G. AN AGREEMENT OR MORATORIUM ON SPACE WEAPONS OR CERTAIN CBMS IN STRATEGIC TALKS. ANYTIME AN AGREEMENT MET THE CRITERIA IT COULD BE BROUGHT OUT AND APPROVED. AT NO TIME DID GROMYKO INDICATE THAT THEY HAD GIVEN UP THEIR DEMAND THAT THE OBJECTIVE FOR ONE OF THE FORA WAS

SECRET

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0172 DTG: 080206Z JAN 85 PSN: 077179

PREVENTION OF THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE. HE DID SAY

BT

NO  
DIS

NO  
DIS

NO  
DIS

NO  
DIS

SECRET

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0172 DTG: 080206Z JAN 85 PSN: 077178  
SIT974 AN011195 TOR: 008/0225Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM SIT /007

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGVA #0172 0080219  
O 080206Z JAN 85 ZFF6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9805

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 1018

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

EO 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: UR, US, PARM, PREL  
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE

MAGNANIMOUSLY THAT OF COURSE SUCH MATTERS AS NON-FIRST  
USE, FREEZE PROPOSALS, TTBT/PNE AND CTB COULD BE  
BROUGHT OUT AND AGREE AT ANY TIME.

10. WE ENDED WITH MY EXPRESSING SOME SKEPTICISM THAT  
WE COULD DO THIS WITH ANY AMBIGUITY REMAINING THAT WE  
WERE PROCEEDING WITH THE THIRD FORA ON THE BASIS OF  
THEIR FORMULA ON THE PREVENTING THE MILITARIZATION OF  
SPACE. I ALSO STRESSED THAT I WOULD WANT TO

SECRET



## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0172 DTG: 080206Z JAN 85 PSN: 077178

PERSONALLY KEEP A CLOSE HAND ON ANY SUCH TALKS AS THEY  
PROCEED AND WOULD HOPE TO HAVE PERIODIC REVIEWS TO  
MOVE THEM ALONG.

SHULTZ

BT

SECRET

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0164 DTG: 071347Z JAN 85 PSN: 076736  
SIT931 AN011155 TOR: 007/1358Z

DISTRIBUTION: COMM /002

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGA #0164 0071350  
O 071347Z JAN 85 ZFF4  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

7 Jan: One cy to Cable Sec

8 Jan: One cy to C/ACIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9792  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

One cy to EA/DCI

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 SECTO 1015

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US, UR, PREL, PARM  
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON THE SECRETARY'S  
- FIRST MEETING WITH GROMYKO, MONDAY MORNING,  
JANUARY 7, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SUBJECT: MY FIRST MEETING WITH GROMYKO  
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

1. WE BEGAN OUR TALKS IN WHAT I BELIEVE WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE WITH A THREE-HOUR EXCHANGE ON STRATEGIC PHILOSOPHY--ON GROMYKO'S PART--AND A LAYING OUT IN A VERY DETAILED FORM OF OUR VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT. GROMYKO'S MANNER WAS CALM. BUSINESSLIKE AND FORCEFUL. HE READ LARGE PORTIONS OF HIS PRESENTATION, INDICATING THAT THESE WERE AGREED POLITBURO POSITIONS. HE TALKED AT ALL TIMES AS IF THE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WERE A FACT BUT OF COURSE PUT GREAT STRESS--AS WE EXPECTED HE WOULD--ON THE OBJECTIVES AND GOALS OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

2. THERE WAS BRIEF INTERCHANGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT OUTSET WITH ME ASSERTING THEIR IMPORTANCE IN THE OVERALL RELATION AND GROMYKO SAYING HE WOULD NOT DISCUSS A MATTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

3. MY PRESENTATION OF U.S. POSITION CLOSELY FOLLOWED AGREED TALKING POINTS (WHICH WE ARE SENDING SEPARATELY IN FULL) COVERING:

- EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
- OUR VIEW OF THE WAY IT SHOULD EVOLVE
- OUR VIEW OF SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS

4. FOR HIS PART, GROMYKO, AFTER A LONG PLEA FOR NEGOTIATIONS AS THE ONLY WAY TO HEAD-OFF CATASTROPHE, SET SEVERAL GENERAL CONDITIONS OR PRINCIPLES. WE SHOULD AGREE ON THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE SHOULD BASE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. THE PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE FORCES CANNOT BE SETTLED IN THE

SECRET

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

25X1

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0164 DTG: 071347Z JAN 85 PSN: 076736

ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT TO PREVENT THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE. ONLY THIS CAN STRENGTHEN STRATEGIC STABILITY.

5. HE WENT ON TO LAY OUT SPECIFIC GOALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS:

TO PREVENT THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE WE MUST INSTITUTE A BAN ON DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ATTACK SPACE WEAPONS AND ELIMINATE ANY WEAPONS OF THAT KIND ALREADY DEPLOYED. HE DEFINED THESE WEAPONS AS ANYTHING BASED ON ANY PHYSICAL PRINCIPLE OR BASING MODE TO ATTACK TARGETS IN OUTER SPACE OR FROM SPACE TO ATTACK WEAPONS ON LAND, SEA, IN THE AIR, OR ON EARTH. HE INCLUDED ASAT AND RELEVANT ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEMS.

6. ON STRATEGIC ARMS, IF THERE IS A BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO ACCEPT RADICAL REDUCTIONS PLUS RENUNCIATION OF NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, NEW TYPES OF ICBMS, SLBMS AND BOMBERS. HE ADDED THAT INF CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BECAUSE THE SYSTEMS WE HAVE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE CAN HIT THE USSR AND ARE THEREFORE, BY DEFINITION, STRATEGIC.

7. ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES THERE SHOULD BE A GOAL TO STOP US DEPLOYMENTS AND STOP SOVIET COUNTER-DEPLOYMENTS, FOLLOWED BY REDUCTIONS TO NEW LOWER LEVELS

WHICH MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF UK AND FRENCH FORCES. STRATEGIC ARMS CANNOT BE SETTLED IN ISOLATION FROM MEDIUM-RANGE ARMS.

8. GROMYKO CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT ALL THESE MATTERS ARE LINKED AND MUST BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER. WE WANT, HE SAID, FAIR AND OBJECTIVE AGREEMENTS. WE WANT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH YOU. WE HARBOR NO EVIL DESIGNS.

9. IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE, GROMYKO ASKED FOR MY ENTIRE THREE-QUARTER HOUR PRESENTATION TO BE TRANSLATED QUOTE, BECAUSE I UNDERSTAND IT TO BE AN IMPORTANT STATEMENT  
BT

SECRET

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0164 DTG: 071347Z JAN 85 PSN: 076740  
SIT932 AN011156 TOR: 007/1356Z

DISTRIBUTION: COMM /002

OP IMMED  
DE RUFHGVA #0164 0071352  
O 071347Z JAN 85 ZFF4  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9793  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 SECTO 1015

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US, UR, PREL, PARM  
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON THE SECRETARY'S  
OF PRINCIPLE. UNQUOTE.

10. OUR PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS  
ARE DRIVING FOR A SINGLE FORUM TO DISCUSS ALL SUBJECTS  
BUT PERHAPS WITH SUBGROUPS. ON SUBSTANCE, THERE APPEARS  
TO BE NOTHING NEW. WE'LL CABLE AGAIN AFTER THE AFTER-  
NOON SESSION. SHULTZ  
BT

SECRET